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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
)

Case No. 960512-CA

(

Priority No. 2

vs.
MICHAEL R. ALLAN,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended).

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Officer
Moore had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of defendant
Michael R. Allan's vehicle?
There are two standards of review, one to the factual
findings and the other to the conclusion of law.

"The trial

court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress are examined for clear error."

State v.

Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).
1

x>

[T]he standard to be applied

to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as found give
rise to reasonable suspicion *is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness . . . .' " Ld. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).
"Nevertheless, the nature of this particular determination of law
allows the trial court *a measure of discretion . . . when
applying that standard to a given set of facts.' " Ld. (quoting
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939) .

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Michael R. Allan was arrested March 27, 1995, and
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44, a Class B misdemeanor.
Defendant challenged the legality of the police officer's stop of
his vehicle, claiming that it constituted an unlawful search and
seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution in that the investigatory stop of his vehicle
was not supported by "reasonable suspicion."

On February 15,

1996, a Suppression Hearing was conducted before the Honorable

2

Ray M. Harding, Jr.
suppress.

Judge Harding denied defendant's motion to

On May 28, 1996, in a bench trial before Judge

Harding, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence.
Defendant was sentenced July 15, 1996, and on July 29, 1996,
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District
Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 p.m., Provo City
Police Officer Brian Moore was on routine patrol in the downtown
area of Provo (R. 102). At that time he was dispatched to a
suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot (Ld.).

Officer

Moore was within four blocks of Albertson's and responded to the
call in close to a minute's time (R. 101). Dispatch indicated to
Officer Moore that someone on the pay phone at Albertson's was
"indicating that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and
they were concerned they were going to drive." (Id.)

The

informant had told dispatch that the suspect was "impaired
walking." (R. 95)

Such information was relayed to Officer Moore

(Id.).
When Officer Moore arrived at the parking lot, the
individual was still on the pay phone with dispatch (Id.).

The

individual got the officer's attention by waving his hands and
pointing (^Id.). As Officer Moore approached the informant, the

3

informant hung up the phone and came over towards the vehicle
(][d.).

He pointed, indicating that there was an individual

walking that had just gotten out of a red camero and was
returning to the red camero (R. 100-101).

The informant believed

that the man was intoxicated (R. 100). Officer Moore saw the red
camero, it was the only one in the parking lot (Ixi.).

His

attention was drawn to the vehicle and he felt "like it was
extremely important to investigate instead of talking with the
individual any longer." (Id.) After talking with the officer,
the informant turned around and headed into Albertson's (Id.).
According to Officer Moore, "the parking lot was really
congested with people." (R. 99)

The congestion forced Officer

Moore "to go ahead and to drive back around through the parking
lot in order to come up with this vehicle, because it was about
four or five cars back." (^d.)

From the location of his police

car, the officer could not back up because of other vehicles
(Id.).

At this point, when Officer Moore was close to

defendant's vehicle, he initiated a stop of the vehicle.

He

stated that he "had reasonable suspicion to believe that there
was possibly an intoxicated person there." (Id.)

The vehicle had

just started to back out of a parking stall when Officer Moore
operated his overhead lights to detain the vehicle (Id.).
Officer Moore approached the vehicle and from the plain
smell of alcohol about the person of the driver was justified to
continue investigating and subsequently had probable cause to
4

arrest the driver for driving under the influence.
was identified as defendant Michael Allan.

The driver

Subsequent testing

confirmed defendant's blood alcohol level to be above that
allowed by law for an operator of a vehicle.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Investigative stops by police officers

constitute seizures and must be justified by reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.

In this case, Officer Moore reasonably

relied on information given from dispatch and from the informant
himself.

A private citizen called police dispatch and stated

that he observed a specific person later identified as the
defendant whom he believed to be intoxicated and who was going to
drive away.

The citizen told dispatch that his belief was based

on his observation that the defendant was "impaired walking."
Dispatch relayed this information to Officer Moore.
Officer Moore responded immediately to the call and talked
directly with the informant.

The officer obtained three specific

facts from the informant: 1) the specific person, the defendant,
whom informant had observed and had actually pointed out to the
officer, 2) the specific vehicle which the defendant was
approaching, entering, and preparing to drive, namely, a red
camero, and 3) that the informant believed that the defendant was
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intoxicated.
An investigating officer's reasonable suspicion may be based
on the information of third parties, without independent or
corroborating observations.

Based on the information imparted

from dispatch, and from the informant, and from the circumstances
of the situation, Officer Moore initiated an immediate
investigative stop of the vehicle.

The facts and circumstances

apparent to Officer Moore were sufficient to constitute
"reasonable suspicion" that defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol.

Therefore, Officer Moore could initiate an

investigative stop based upon that reasonable suspicion.

The

trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence from the investigative stop of defendant's vehicle.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT OFFICER
MOORE HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
A.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), this Court
outlined the constitutional and legal framework for the inquiry
into the validity of investigative stops by police officers.
"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute
a xseizure' within the meaning of the [Fourth and Fourteenth]
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
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the resulting detention quite brief."

Id. at 1276 (quoting

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).

The United States

Supreme Court set forth a "two-prong test to overcome the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.

First,

the officer's initial stop must be justified; second, subsequent
actions must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying
the stop."

Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).

The question presented here, as in Case,/ concerns only the first
prong: whether the officer was justified in stopping defendant's
vehicle.

Utah codified the Terry rule for investigative stops at

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, which states that a stop is justified
if there is "reasonable suspicion to believe [the suspect] has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense . . . ."

This Court stated:

While the required level of suspicion is lower than the
standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to
determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable
facts" to support reasonable suspicion.
Id. (quoting Terry, 396 U.S. at 21).

Furthermore, investigating

officers "may rely on other sources of information [e.g.
bulletins, flyers, and dispatches].

An investigative stop may

survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on
information." Id. at 1277. Depending on the particular
circumstances, the officer is not required to obtain additional
independent or corroborative information. See id. at 1277.
7

B.

Officer Moore had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on
the information imparted from dispatch and from the informant
Turning to the facts and circumstances of this particular

case, Officer Moore, relying on information both from dispatch
and from the informant, was justified in his investigative stop
of defendant's vehicle based on information relayed by dispatch
and through communication with the informant himself.
The specific information relayed to the officer from
dispatch was that a private citizen "had seen somebody that was
intoxicated, and [the citizen] was concerned [the defendant] was
going to drive." (R. 101)

The informant was calling from a pay

phone outside of Albertson's.

Dispatch also told Officer Moore

that the defendant was "impaired walking." (R. 95)
Officer Moore responded immediately to the call.

When he

arrived at the parking lot, the citizen informant waved his hands
to get the officer's attention, hung up the phone, and approached
the officer's vehicle.

The officer obtained three specific facts

from the informant: 1) the specific person, the defendant, whom
informant had observed and had actually pointed out to the
officer, 2) the specific vehicle which the defendant was
approaching, entering, and preparing to drive, namely a red
camero, and 3) that the informant believed the defendant was
intoxicated.
Defendant asserts that "the claimant expressed no

8

information to either dispatch or to Officer Moore as to the
basis for his belief that Allan was intoxicated."
Brief p. 9.

Defendant

Defendant cites and quotes portions of the following

language of Case: "Merely providing descriptive information to an
officer about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify
the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which
establish why a stop was to be made."

Case, 884 P.2d at 1278.

However, in this case, Officer Moore did point to the articulable
and specific facts noted above.

Officer Moore knew both the

source and the content of the information.

See id. at 1279. The

officer knew "whom to stop" (defendant in the only red camero in
the parking lot) and "why" to stop him (dispatch had said the
informant had seen him "impaired walking" and the informant told
the officer he believed the defendant was intoxicated).

Officer

Moore could reasonably infer that the informant had seen
defendant's behavior and walking pattern and noted that it was
"impaired."

In this context, "impaired walking" clearly denotes

unnatural, unbalanced, erratic, unsteady, and/or a host of other
adjectives describing walking in a way consistent with alcohol
influence. Officer Moore acted reasonably upon the information he
received.

Officer Moore noted the exigency of the situation and

the "extreme importance" to investigate (R. 100). The congestion
of the parking lot with people and cars warranted an immediate
investigation.

Had Officer Moore not directed his attention to

9

the suspect vehicle and stopped it when he did, the vehicle could
have left and either 1) potential injury to persons in the lot or
on the street could have occurred or 2) the officer might not
have been able to catch up to the suspect vehicle, or 3) both.

C.

No independent or corroborating evidence was necessary

This Court, in Case, stated the following regarding
independent or corroborating evidence:
[I]f the investigating officer cannot provide independent or
corroborating information through his or her own
observations, the legality of the stop based on information
imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the
articulable facts known to the individual originating
the
information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon
by the investigating officer.
Id. at 1277.

The specific and articulable information given to

Officer Moore was sufficient to justify an investigative stop of
defendant's vehicle without the need for independent or
corroborating observations.

D.

Defendant's reliance on State v. Roth is misplaced

Defendant looks to State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App.
1992), to support his argument that Officer Moore did not have
reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop.

See

Defendant's Brief pp.7-8.
Although, as Defendant asserts, "the articulated facts
apparant [sic] to the officer . . . in Roth go far beyond the
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facts in this case" (see Defendant's Brief p. 8), the inquiry
must be to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.
See Case, 884 P.2d at 1276 n.l; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 940 (Utah 1994).

First, this case involves communication to

the officer both from dispatch and from an informant.

The

officer communicated directly with the source of the information,
thereby confirming the information obtained from dispatch and
getting additional information as to the suspect and the vehicle.
There was no concern for "information-laundering."

See Case, 884

P.2d at 1278 n.7 (expressing concern for such abuse as passing
information through police channels to "validate" otherwise
"bogus information" or "to secure action based only on police
hunches").
Second, whereas information from security officers may carry
heightened indicia of reliability, clearly there can be no
requirement that information must originate from security or law
enforcement officers or their equivalents to be reliable.

The

Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983),
stated, "Veracity is generally assumed when the information comes
from an ^average citizen who is in a position to supply
information by virtue of having been a crime victim or witness.'"
Id. at 180 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 3.3
(1978)).

In this case, there was no reason for Officer Moore to

question the reliability of the citizen informant.
on his own volition called dispatch.
11

The citizen

He gave information

regarding his belief that an intoxicated person, whom he had
observed "impaired walking," was going to drive a vehicle.

The

citizen waved to get the attention of the responding officer,
approached the officer's car, and gave specific information as to
the person and the vehicle, again asserting that he believed the
individual, the defendant, was intoxicated.

The citizen

informant only turned around and went into Albertson's when he
saw that the officer was going to investigate.

Under these

facts, the information was quite articulable and specific.

Such

information given directly to the officer, made with a physical
gesture indicating a specific person and vehicle, is as specific
information as could be given.
Third, defendant notes that, in upholding the legality of
the search, the Roth court based its decision in part on the fact
that "the investigating officer had made personal, articulable
observations which corroborated the information received from
dispatch."
259).

Defendant's Brief pp.7-8 (citing Roth, 827 P.2d at

As discussed, supra, this Court in Case, two years

subsequent to Roth, clarified when independent or corroborating
evidence is necessary to justify an investigative stop of a
vehicle.

The Fourth Amendment does not require the officer to

obtain corroborating evidence, where the officer relies on
information given to him, if the person giving the information
has reasonable articulable suspicion. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1277.
This standard articulated in Case, supra this brief p.10, is not
12

"new," rather it is a statement of the standard as recognized
dating prior

to the Roth decision.

See United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221, 232-233 (1985); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650
(Utah 1989) ("reliance on [a] flyer or bulletin justifies a stop
to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to
detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further
information").

From the facts of Roth, it is clear that such

corroborating evidence was not necessary to the finding of
"reasonable suspicion"—its inclusion was mere surplusage.
Therefore, as stated above, independent or corroborating evidence
is not necessary where the information imparted to the officer is
sufficient to warrant "reasonable suspicion" in and of itself.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments above, Officer Moore's investigative
stop of defendant Michael Allan's vehicle was supported and
justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and
articulable facts.

Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and uphold
defendant's conviction for Driving Under the Influence.
DATED this

^fil

day of May, 1997.
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Attorney for Plaihtlff-Appellee
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